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Abstract. Data describing economic growth and the growth of human population in the 
United Kingdom are analysed. Contrary to the widely accepted interpretations, Industrial 
Revolution had no impact on shaping trajectories of economic growth and of the growth of 
population. Within the range of analysable data, there was also no Malthusian stagnation. 
Consequently, there was no escape from Malthusian trap because there was no trap in the 
economic growth and in the growth of human population. The United Kingdom was the 
centre of the Industrial Revolution and yet its data are in the direct contradiction of the 
currently accepted interpretations. It is fortunate that natural processes did not comply 
with our fanciful and wished-for explanations of the mechanism of growth. If they did, if 
the generally claimed takeoffs did occur, it would have been a disaster because economic 
growth and the growth of population would have been already unmanageable everywhere. 
Keywords. United Kingdom, Economic growth, Population growth, Income per capita, 
Malthusian stagnation, Industrial Revolution. 
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1. Introduction 
t is generally believed that at a certain stage of human history, economic 
growth and the growth of population experienced a dramatic transition from the 
endless stagnation to a sustained growth (see for instance, Artzrouni & 
Komlos, 1985; Clark, 2003; Galor, 2005a, 2007; Galor & Weil, 2000; Hansen & 
Prescott, 2002; Klasen & Nestmann, 2006; Kögel & Prskawetz, 2001; Komlos, 
2003; Manfredi & Fanti, 2003; Weiss, 2007). This dramatic event is described as 
the great escape from the Malthusian trap, as a take-off from stagnation to growth 
(Galor, 2005a, 2011) or as a transition to a ―new stage‖ of ―self-sustained growth‖ 
(Kögel & Prskawetz, 2001, p. 338). It was supposed to have been ―a break from 
Malthusian equilibrium‖ (Clark, 2005, p. 1314), the escape characterised by ―the 
unprecedented increase in population growth‖ (Galor, 2005b, p. 494), ―the 
population sprint‖ (Thomlinson, 1965, p. 312) and the time when the ―population 
growth accelerated‖ (Kögel & Prskawetz, 2001, p. 338). It was allegedly a massive 
―simultaneous take-off in economic growth and population growth‖ (Kögel & 
Prskawetz, 2001, p. 338). 
This alleged dramatic escape from the imagined Malthusian trap is claimed to 
have been strongly prompted and assisted by the Industrial Revolution. The rapid 
and far-reaching technological and sociological changes associated with this event 
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are claimed to have been the driving force of the economic and demographic 
transition (Bar & Leukhina, 2005; Clark, 2005; Galor, 2005a; Galor & Mountford, 
2006; Goodfriend & McDermott, 1995; Khan, 2008; Komlos, 1989, 2003; Lucas, 
2002; Manfredi & Fanti 2003; Mataré, 2009; Šimurina & Tica, 2006; Tamura, 
2002; Weiss, 2007). Clark claims that the Industrial Revolution ―represented a 
break from the Malthusian equilibrium‖ (Clark, 2005, p. 1314). According to 
Weiss, Industrial Revolution ―facilitated an endogenous take-off from the 
Malthusian trap‖ (Weiss, 2007, p. 327). Likewise, Komlos claimed that ―The 
industrial revolution can therefore be conceptualized as a break out of the 
Malthusian demographic regime. It was a period of both economic and 
demographic expansion‖ (Komlos, 1989, p. 203). He wrote that ―Industrial 
Revolution was also accompanied by an acceleration in population growth‖ 
(Komlos, 2003, p. 18). ―The Industrial Revolution drove the demographic 
transition‖ (Khan, 2008, p. 9). It ―brought in its wake an accelerated growth in the 
size of human populations‖ (Mataré, 2009, p. 381). According to Galor, ―In the 
first phase of the Industrial Revolution, prior to the implementation of significant 
education reforms, physical capital accumulation was the prime engine of 
economic growth‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 212). 
All such claims, descriptions and explanations of the past growth are not based 
on a scientific analysis of relevant data but on a good dose of fantasy. They may 
sound plausible but they have to be accepted by faith. Science has no room for such 
dubious speculations. Inevitably, when faith is defended, contradicting data are 
either ignored or suitably manipulated to support the preconceived ideas (Ashraf, 
2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005c, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 
2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008).  
Remarkably, however, precisely the same data, when closely analysed, 
demonstrate that the preconceived ideas are incorrect (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g). The established knowledge in 
demography and economic research, the knowledge revolving around the concept 
of Malthusian stagnation and around the concept of the escape from the alleged 
Malthusian trap is not based on the scientific process of investigation (Nielsen, 
2016h). 
In science, even one contradicting evidence in data is sufficient to question 
contradicted interpretations and then to try to revise them or even reject them, but 
in the case of the historical economic growth and of the growth of population we 
now have more than one contradicting evidence (e.g. Biraben, 1980; Clark, 1968; 
Cook, 1960; Durand, 1967, 1974, 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Kapitza, 2006; 
Kremer, 1993; Livi-Bacci, 2007; Maddison, 2001, 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; 
Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016i, 
2016j; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; 
Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 
1975).  
We have carried out extensive investigation of the leading postulates used to 
explain the historical growth of human population and the historical economic 
growth (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 
2016i, 2016j). In particular, we have demonstrated that within the range of 
analysable data, economic growth and the growth of population were hyperbolic. 
There was no Malthusian stagnation and there was never a takeoff from stagnation 
to growth, which could be described as the escape from the Malthusian trap 
because there was no trap in the economic growth and in the growth of population.  
The range of analysable data describing economic growth, global, regional and 
national, extends down to AD 1 (Maddison, 2001, 2010) but for the world 
economic growth it was extended down to 1,000,000 BC (De Long, 1998). 
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Maddison’s data and the extended estimates show clearly that there was never 
stagnation in the economic growth. 
For the growth of human population, regional and national estimates also 
extend only down to AD 1 (Maddison, 2001, 2010) but for the global growth, 
many estimates are available extending down to 10,000 BC (Biraben, 1980; Clark, 
1968; Cook, 1960; Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 2007; 
McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 
1994, United Nations, 1973, 1999, 2013). They were also extended down to 
1,000,000 million years ago (Deevey, 1960; cited by Kapitza, 2006, Kremer, 1993 
and Livi-Bacci, 2007). From the distance of one million years it does not really 
matter whether it is a million years ago or million years BC. The evidence again is 
clear and consistent: there was no Malthusian stagnation but a steadily-increasing 
growth, interrupted only twice in the past million years, or maybe three times if we 
count the minor disturbance between AD 1200 and 1400 (Nielsen, 2016j). Each 
time, population growth was diverted from one hyperbolic growth to another.  Our 
analysis, which is in harmony with earlier research (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; 
Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von 
Hoerner, 1975), shows that fundamental postulates accepted by the established 
knowledge in demography and in economic research are repeatedly and clearly 
contradicted by data.  
We have also demonstrated that the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud & 
McCloskey, 1994) had no impact on shaping the trajectories of economic growth 
and of the growth of population. Now we are going to demonstrate that Industrial 
Revolution had absolutely no impact on shaping the growth of population and the 
economic growth in the United Kingdom, the very centre of this revolution where 
its effects should be most convincingly demonstrated.  
In our diagrams, population data will be expressed in billions while the data for 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in billions of 1990 International Geary-Khamis 
dollars. The GDP per capita (GDP/cap) values will be expressed in 1990 
International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
 
2. Analysis of the growth of population in the UK 
Hyperbolic growth can be uniquely identified by studying the reciprocal values 
of data (Nielsen, 2014) because hyperbolic growth is then represented by a 
decreasing straight line. For a sufficiently large range of data, if they follow a 
decreasing straight line, the growth is hyperbolic. In such displays, it is also easy to 
identify even small deviations from hyperbolic distributions because deviations 
from a straight line are easy to notice. In particular, any boosting in the economic 
growth or in the growth of population, such as the expected boosting caused by the 
Industrial Revolution should be readily identified.  
For the reciprocal values, effects are reversed. A boosting of growth is indicted 
by a clear change of the trend in the downward direction while a diversion to a 
slower trajectory is indicated by an upward bending in the growth trajectory. 
Results of our analysis of population data (Maddison, 2010) in the United 
Kingdom are presented in Figures 1-3.  
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Figure 1. Hyperbolic growth of population in the UK between AD 1 and 1850 as 
demonstrated by the decreasing straight line fitting the reciprocal values of the population 
data. Industrial Revolution did not boost the growth of the population in the UK. On the 
contrary, it coincided with the commencement of the gradually slowing down growth. 
 
 
Figure 2. The end part of the plot presented in Figure 1 showing that from around 1850, 
just at the end of the Industrial Revolution, the growth of the population in the UK started 
to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Industrial Revolution did not boost the growth of 
population in the UK. 
 
 
Figure 3. Growth of population in the UK between AD 1 and 2008. Growth was hyperbolic 
between AD 1 and 1850. From around 1850, towards the end of the Industrial Revolution, 
the growth of population started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Industrial Revolution 
had no impact on shaping the growth trajectory. 
 
In Figure 1 we show the reciprocal values of population data. Between AD 1 
and 1850 they follow closely a decreasing straight line, showing that the growth of 
population was hyperbolic. Within the range of analysable data, which extends 
down to AD 1, the mythical epoch of Malthusian stagnation did not exist in the 
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UK. The proof of the existence of Malthusian stagnation would have to be based 
on the demonstration of the existence of Malthusian oscillations. The data 
displayed in Figure 1 follow closely an undisturbed linear distribution representing 
an undisturbed and stable hyperbolic trajectory, indicating that even if random 
Malthusian forces were present they had no effect on changing the growth 
trajectory. Any assumption of the presence of such forces is irrelevant.  
It is also clear that the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 
1994) had absolutely no impact on changing the growth trajectory. Data displayed 
in Figures 1-3 show clearly that there was no often-claimed boosting in the growth 
of population, no sprinting, explosion or any form of strong acceleration. On the 
contrary, from around 1850, shortly after the Industrial Revolution, the growth of 
population started to be diverted to a slower trajectory as indicated by the upper 
bending of the trajectory of reciprocal values shown clearly in Figure 2 and by a 
clear deviation from the hyperbolic trajectory shown in Figure 3.  
These are remarkable results because the UK was in the centre of the Industrial 
Revolution. It is here that the effects of this revolution should be most strongly and 
most convincingly demonstrated but the data are in the direct contradiction of such 
expectations. It seems obvious that Industrial Revolution brought about many 
changes in the style of living and in social interactions, beneficial or detrimental, 
but all these changes had no effect on the growth of human population. It is as if 
this monumental event never happened.   
Hyperbolic growth is described by a simple formula: 
 
1
( )S t
a kt


        (1) 
 
where ( )S t  is the size of the growing entity (in our case either population or the 
GDP), while a and k are positive constants. 
The increasing hyperbolic distribution, which could be also called the first-order 
hyperbolic distributions, is just the reciprocal of a decreasing straight line. That is 
why, a decreasing straight line of the reciprocal values identifies uniquely the first-
order hyperbolic distribution.  
Parameters of the hyperbolic distribution shown in Figure 3 are: 31.210 10a  
and 16.366 10k   . Its singularity is at 1901t  . If continued along its historical 
trajectory, the growth of the population in the UK would have escaped to infinity in 
1901. Fortunately, from around 1850 is started to be diverted to a slower trajectory 
bypassing the singularity by a safe margin of 51 years. 
 
3. Analysis of the economic growth in the UK 
Results of mathematical analysis of the historical GDP data for the UK are 
presented in Figures 4-6, while for the historical income per capita (GDP/cap) they 
are shown in Figure 7.  
Reciprocal values displayed in Figure 4 show that the growth of the GDP was at 
first increasing along a fast, hyperbolic trajectory, as shown by a steep straight line 
fitting the reciprocal values of data. However, from around AD 1600, i.e. about 160 
years before the commencement of the Industrial Revolution, the growth of the 
GDP was diverted to a slower hyperbolic trajectory as indicated by a less-steep 
straight line. This slower trajectory remained totally unaffected by the Industrial 
Revolution. This event did not even manage to revert the economic growth to the 
state experienced before AD 1600, when the hyperbolic trajectory was significantly 
faster. This slower hyperbolic growth continued until around AD 1850 when it 
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started to be diverted to even slower trajectory indicated by an upward bending 
shown in Figure 5.  
There was definitely no boosting in the economic growth caused by or 
associated with the Industrial Revolution. There was even no visible delay in the 
diversion to a slower trajectory. Industrial Revolution had no effect on the 
economic growth trajectory.  
Again, these results are remarkable because the UK was right at the centre of 
the Industrial Revolution and it should have experienced its strong effect on the 
economic growth and on the growth of population. Technological and sociological 
changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution were present but, surprisingly 
perhaps, they did not accelerate the economic growth. It was as if economic growth 
were prompted by some other, much stronger force, which overruled any possible 
impacts of the Industrial Revolution. It would be interesting to identify this force 
but it is clear that the usual explanations based on the hypothetical forces of 
Malthusian stagnation and on the equally hypothetical forces of the Industrial 
Revolution, including the forces of technological development, are irrelevant for 
explaining the mechanism of the historical economic growth.  
 
 
Figure 4. Reciprocal values of the GDP data for the UK (Maddison, 2010) are compared with the 
decreasing linear distributions representing hyperbolic growth. The growth of the GDP was 
following a fast-increasing hyperbolic distribution (represented by a fast decreasing straight line) 
until AD 1600. From around that year and until around AD 1850, the economic growth was following 
a slower hyperbolic trajectory. Within the range of analysable data, i.e. from AD 1, the mythical 
epoch of Malthusian stagnation did not exist. 
 
 
Figure 5. The end part of the display shown in Figure 4. The slower hyperbolic growth, which 
commenced around AD 1600 (as indicated by the gently-decreasing straight line), continued 
undisturbed until AD 1850, i.e. throughout the entire time of the Industrial Revolution, which had 
absolutely no impact on the economic growth trajectory. There was no escape from the Malthusian 
trap because there was no trap. From around AD 1850, the growth of the GDP started to be diverted 
to a slower trajectory, as indicated by the upward bending of the reciprocal values trajectory. 
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Figure 6. Economic growth (as described by the GDP) in the UK. The growth was 
hyperbolic between AD 1 and 1600 and again (but a little slower) between AD 1600 and 
1850. From around 1850, the growth started to be diverted to a slower but non-hyperbolic 
trajectory. Within the range of analysable data, i.e. from AD 1, the mythical epoch of 
stagnation did not exist. Economic growth was steadily increasing. Industrial Revolution 
did not boost the economic growth. There was no escape from the Malthusian trap because 
there was no trap. 
 
 
Figure 7. Growth of income per capita (GDP/cap) in the UK between AD 1 and 2008. The 
GDP data follow closely the empirically-determined linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distributions (defined in Nielsen, 2015a). Industrial Revolution did not change the growth 
trajectory. From around 1850, the growth of the GDP/cap started to be diverted to a 
slower trajectory. 
 
Hyperbolic fits to the GDP data are shown in Figure 6. The fast hyperbolic 
growth between AD 1 and 1600 is described by 03.120 10a    and 31.849 10k     
Its singularity is at 1687t  . Contrary to the doctrine of Malthusian stagnation, 
economic growth was remarkably fast. If continued, it would escape to infinity 
about 73 years before the commencement of the Industrial Revolution. The slower 
hyperbolic growth of the GDP, which commenced in around AD 1600 is described 
by 01.106 10a   and 45.909 10k   .  Its singularity is at 1872t  . This was also 
a steadily-increasing economic growth at the time when it was supposed to have 
been stagnant.  
Population and economic growth data for the UK, and in particular the 
relatively fast economic growth before AD 1600, show how absurd is the concept 
of Malthusian stagnation. This concept is consistently contradicted by the analysis 
of other data describing economic growth and the growth of population (Kapitza, 
2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 
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2016f, 2016g, 2016i, 2016j; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; von Foerster, 
Mora & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975).  
The data for the UK show also how absurd is the doctrine of the boosting 
effects of the Industrial Revolution. The GDP and GDP/cap were already following 
fast-increasing trajectories before the Industrial Revolution. If continued, economic 
growth would escape to infinity in AD 1872. Any boosting by the Industrial 
Revolution would have been disastrous. Fortunately, natural processes did not 
comply with this ludicrous concept. Economic growth in the UK was not boosted 
by the Industrial Revolution but it was soon diverted into a slower pathway. 
The same argument applies to the global and regional economic growth and to 
the global and regional growth of population. Propelled by the historical hyperbolic 
growth, they are now increasing too fast. Any boosting by the Industrial 
Revolution, any differential timing of the alleged takeoffs claimed by Galor 
(2005a, 2011), would be disastrous because it would propel economic growth and 
the growth of population along even faster trajectories and would render them 
unmanageable. Even now, we are approaching a serious global crisis but with the 
mechanism of growth approved by the established knowledge, this crisis would 
have occurred much earlier.  
Nature or naturally occurring process take no notice of what we think is logical. 
Imagination is important in science but imagination has to be checked by 
meticulous analysis of data. We can propose convincing explanations but what we 
think as convincing is not necessarily what is reflected in the real world. Scientific 
research has to be conducted scientifically; otherwise it is not scientific.  
We can write as many fiction stories as we can possibly imagine them. They 
can be interesting and attractive but they have no place in science. Any theory that 
cannot be checked by data is regarded as unscientific and any theory that is 
contradicted by data has to be modified or even rejected and replaced by a new 
theory. Deliberately distorting the presentation of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 
2005c, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor & 
Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008) to make them comply with preconceived 
ideas is not only unscientific but also self-defeating – we learn nothing from such 
mutilations of scientific evidence. 
Doctrines of Malthusian stagnation and of the dramatic impacts of the Industrial 
Revolution on the growth of population and on the economic growth are repeatedly 
and consistently contradicted. These two doctrines and all the associated 
explanations and elaborate descriptions have no place in the economic and 
demographic research and the sooner they are abandoned the better. The continuing 
use of these doctrines to explain the historical economic growth and the historical 
growth of population is scientifically unjustified. 
Defined by the parameter k, hyperbolic growth between AD 1 and 1600 was 
about three times faster than the hyperbolic growth between AD 1600 and 1850. 
The mythical epoch of stagnation did not exist. The transition around AD 1600 was 
not the usually-imagined transition from stagnation to growth but from growth to 
growth. It was not boosting but a transition from a fast to a slower hyperbolic 
growth. There is absolutely no expected correlation between the economic growth 
in the UK and the Industrial Revolution. No expected boosting and no transition 
from stagnation to growth because there was no stagnation. The wished-for takeoff 
is replaced by a transition to a slower trajectory. The established knowledge in the 
economic research is spectacularly contradicted by data, which were expected to 
give the most convincing support for the generally accepted doctrines.  
The data refuse to comply with the desired and wished-for interpretations of the 
mechanism of economic growth. There was no wished-for escape from the 
Malthusian trap because there was no trap in the economic growth. There was also 
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no trap in the growth of population in the UK. The only way to defend the 
established knowledge is to reject the data for the UK but then we would have to 
reject also other data and their analysed (Biraben, 1980; Clark, 1968; Cook, 1960; 
Durand, 1967, 1974, 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 
1993; Livi-Bacci, 2007; Maddison, 2001, 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Nielsen, 
2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016i, 2016j; 
Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 
1975; Trager, 1994; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975). 
Results of mathematical analysis presented Figure 7 show that the growth of 
income per capita in the UK can be described by two linearly-modulated 
hyperbolic distributions. The trajectory was calculated by dividing two hyperbolic 
distributions fitting the GDP data between AD 1 and 1850 (see Figures 4-6) by the 
hyperbolic distribution fitting the population data between AD 1 and 1850 (see 
Figures 1-3). For the discussion of the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions 
see Nielsen (2015a).  
The growth of income per capita follows closely the empirically-determined 
growth trajectory. Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the linearly-
modulated hyperbolic growth. From around 1850, shortly after this industrial 
event, the growth of income per capita started to be diverted to a slower trajectory.  
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
The United Kingdom was in the centre of the Industrial Revolution. It is, 
therefore, the perfect place to test the currently accepted concept that the Industrial 
Revolution boosted economic growth and the growth of population. This concept is 
closely linked with the concept of Malthusian stagnation and the concept of the 
escape from the Malthusian trap. All these props are used to explain the mechanism 
of the economic growth and of the growth of human population. We have already 
demonstrated that all these accepted interpretations are contradicted by data 
(Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016i, 
2016j). Now, we have focused our attention of the centre of the Industrial 
Revolution. 
We have analysed the data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of 
population, the growth of the GDP and the growth of the GDP/cap in the UK. We 
have demonstrated that the historical growth of population and of the GDP were 
hyperbolic. Consequently, the historical growth of income per capita (GDP/cap) 
was linearly-modulated hyperbolic (Nielsen, 2015a).  
We have demonstrated that over the entire range of the mathematically-
analysable data, which in this case extends down to AD 1, the epoch of Malthusian 
stagnation did not exist. The growth of the population and the economic growth 
were increasing steadily without any signs of Malthusian stagnation. 
We have demonstrated that the Industrial Revolution had absolutely no impact 
on shaping the growth of population and the economic growth in the UK, the very 
centre of this revolution where its effects should have been most clearly 
demonstrated. Thus, we have demonstrated yet again that the often-claimed effects 
of the Industrial Revolution on shaping the growth of population or on shaping the 
economic growth are contradicted by data. 
The established knowledge in demography and in economic research is 
scientifically unacceptable (Nielsen, 2016h). It is contradicted by data and it flies in 
the face of everything we know about the current economic and demographic 
problems, which need to be urgently solved.  
There was no transition from stagnation to a sustained growth regime (Galor, 
2005a, 2011). The past growth was stable and secure as demonstrated by the 
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largely undisturbed hyperbolic distributions but now, even though it became 
diverted from the fast increasing hyperbolic distributions to slower trajectories, it is 
still too fast and consequently insecure (Nielsen, 2015b).We might still have a 
sustained economic growth and sustained growth of population but it is generally 
acknowledged that in the long run our sustained growth is unsustainable because 
for the first time in human history we have already reached and crossed the 
ecological capacity of our planet (WWF, 2010).  
The currently accepted paradigm based on the concept of Malthusian 
stagnation, on the concept of the escape from the Malthusian trap and on the 
concept of the boosting effects of innovations and technological development as 
represented by the Industrial Revolution, by the progress in medicine and by the 
dramatic changes in the style of living, is not only scientifically untenable but it is 
also potentially dangerous because it propagates the idea that after the endless 
epoch of stagnation we have now entered at last the sustained growth regime 
(Galor, 2005a, 2011). The real world in different. We have not escaped a 
Malthusian trap because there was no trap in the growth of population and in the 
economic growth. However, after the ages-long stable and secure growth, our 
current growth is no longer sustainable. For the first time in human history we have 
found ourselves in the trap of the fast-increasing economic growth and in the fast-
increasing growth of population.  
The erroneous traditional interpretations of economic growth and of the growth 
of human population are well illustrated in the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 
2005a, 2011) based firmly on these incorrect concepts. In conformity with the 
traditional interpretations, Galor divided economic growth and the growth of 
population into three regimes: the Malthusian Epoch, the Post-Malthusian Regime 
and the Sustained Growth Regime. Economic growth and the growth of population 
is then explained using various complicated mechanisms, different for each of the 
imagined regimes. These erroneous concepts are supported by suitably distorted 
presentations of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005c, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 
2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 
2008).  
Data are never analysed. In their distorted presentations they appear to support 
the erroneous concepts based on impressions and on a good dose of fantasy. 
However, when analysed, precisely the same data show that the traditionally 
accepted doctrines have no support in science. Furthermore, they suggest that the 
mechanism of the historical economic growth and of the growth of population must 
be simple because they are described by the exceptionally simple mathematical 
distributions. 
While the paradigm based on the concept of the endless epoch of stagnation 
followed by a sustained growth regime, creates a sense of security and prosperity, 
the data show that the opposite is true. It was the past growth that was safe and 
secure because it is described by the generally steadily increasing trajectories. 
However, now, for the first time in human history, our economic growth and the 
growth of human population is uncertain and insecure. We might reach a certain 
maximum in the growth of human population during the current century but we 
might not (Nielsen, 2006, 2015b, 2016h). The future is far from certain. 
Interpretations of the mechanism of the historical economic growth and of the 
historical growth of population have to be based on data, and data are in the direct 
contradiction of the currently accepted paradigm (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 
2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016i, 2016j). These interpretations 
have to be based on accepting hyperbolic growth. There is no choice: the 
traditional paradigm based on the concept of Malthusian stagnation followed by a 
distinctly new regime of sustained growth has to be replaced by the evidence 
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presented by data that the past growth was hyperbolic but that, relatively recently, 
it was diverted to new trajectories.  
Hyperbolic distributions may be confusing. They may create an illusion of 
stagnation followed by an explosion but this illusion is not a valid excuse for 
creating the whole system of scientifically unsupported doctrines and 
interpretations because the analysis of hyperbolic distributions is trivially simple 
(Nielsen, 2014). Anyone can do it and see that the currently accepted paradigm 
based on the assumption of the existence of Malthusian stagnation followed by the 
alleged escape from the Malthusian trap has no scientific support.  
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